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(forthcoming in the Journal of Finance)
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes how blockholders can exert governance even if they cannot intervene in
a rms operations. Blockholders have strong incentives to monitor the rms fundamental
value, since they can sell their stakes upon negative information. By trading on private
information (following the Wall Street Rule), they cause prices to reect fundamental
value rather than current earnings. This in turn encourages managers to invest for long-
run growth rather than short-term prots. Contrary to the view that the U.S.s liquid
markets and transient shareholders exacerbate myopia, I show that they can encourage
investment by impounding its e¤ects into prices.
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The nature of competition has changed, placing a premium on investment in increasingly
complex and intangible forms  the kinds of investment most penalized by the U.S. [capital
allocation] system.Porter (1992)
This paper analyzes how outside blockholders can induce managers to undertake e¢ cient
real investment through their informed trading of the rms shares. By gathering information
about a rms fundamental value and impounding it into prices, they encourage managers to
undertake investment that increases long-run value even if it reduces interim prots. The model
therefore addresses two broad issues. First, it introduces a potential solution to managerial
myopia. Second, it demonstrates that shareholders can add signicant value even if they cannot
intervene in a rms operations. This may explain the prevalence in the U.S. of small transient
blockholders, who typically lack control rights and instead follow the Wall Street Rule of
voting with their feetselling their stock if dissatised.
Many academics and practitioners believe that myopia is a rst-order problem faced by the
modern rm. In the last century, rms were predominantly capital-intensive, but nowadays
competitive success increasingly depends on intangible assets such as human capital and R&D
capabilities (Zingales (2000)). Building such competencies requires signicant and sustained
investment. Indeed, Thurow (1993) argues that investment is an issue of national importance
that will critically determine the U.S.s success in global competition.
However, managers may fail to invest if they are concerned with the rms short-term stock
price. Since the benets of intangible investment are only visible in the long run, the immediate
e¤ect of such investment is to depress earnings. Indeed, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopals (2005)
survey nds that 78% of executives would sacrice long-term value to meet earnings targets.
Moreover, the recent rise in equity-based compensation1 (Murphy (2003)) and the sensitivity
of CEO turnover to the stock price (Kaplan and Minton (2006)) has likely increased managers
myopic tendencies.
While previous papers have focused on various causes of myopia, this paper analyzes a
solution: blockholders. A blockholder has strong incentives to gather costly information about
the rms fundamental value, that is, to learn whether weak earnings result from low rm quality
or desirable long-term investment.2 If the cause is low quality, the blockholder prots by selling
her stake, depressing the stock price. If the cause is desirable investment, she does not sell,
which attenuates the stock price decline caused by weak earnings. In both cases, the blockholder
causes stock prices to reect fundamental value rather than short-term earnings. This increased
market e¢ ciency improves real e¢ ciency: the manager is willing to undertake investments that
boost fundamental value even if they depress short-term earnings. The Wall Street adage
1Equity compensation would not induce myopia if it had very long vesting periods. However, vesting periods
are often short in practice (Kole (1997), Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009)), perhaps because very long vesting
periods would subject the manager to high risk.
2Investmentcan encompass any action that enhances rm value, but worsens outsidersperceptions in the
short run. Low investmentcan therefore represent accounting manipulation to improve outsidersshort-term
perceptions. Blockholders can deter such manipulation as they can see throughthe numbers and will sell if
high earnings are not backed up by strong fundamentals.
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that the market sells rst and asks questions later does not apply to blockholders: owing
to their sizable holdings, they have the incentive to ask questions rst and not automatically
sell upon losses. A noted real-life example is Warren Bu¤ett, who typically acquires blocks in
companies with signicant growth opportunities. His investment shields the rm from stock
market concerns, helping it to focus on long-term value.
In sum, while the blockholders monitoring and trading is motivated by her private desire
to earn prots at the expense of liquidity investors, they have real social benets by inducing
e¢ cient investment. But why does such monitoring and trading have to be undertaken by
blockholders? Many empirical studies use block size as a proxy for investor sophistication,
assuming that large investors have greater incentives to become informed (see Boehmer and
Kelley (2009) and Rubin (2007) for recent examples). Although this concept appears intuitive,
it is not delivered in standard informed trading models since an investors ability to trade
on information is independent of her stake. The model introduces a short-sales constraint to
provide a framework underpinning the assumed positive link between block size and information.
If short sales are prohibited (or su¢ ciently costly), the only way to prot from bad news is to
sell an existing position. The larger the initial holding, the more the blockholder can sell upon
negative information, and so the greater the incentives to collect information in the rst place.
The role of blockholders in this paper di¤ers from prior models, where they add value
through direct intervention such as forcing a restructuring or vetoing a pet project.3 This
paper shows that blockholders can improve rm value even if they are unable to intervene
(engage in voice) and can only trade (engage in exit). This departure from the literature
is empirically motivated. Blockholders in the U.S. rarely intervene, because they are typically
small4 and face signicant legal and institutional barriers.5 Existing models thus have di¢ culty
in explaining the role that such blockholders play in corporate governance, and thus justifying
why they are so prevalent.6 Moreover, the lack of large blockholders and consequent rarity of
intervention may suggest that U.S. rms are poorly governed and that policy action is desirable.
This paper o¤ers an alternative perspective blockholders can still exert governance even if
they lack control rights. In addition to evidence on the barriers to intervention, there is also
3Examples include Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), Pagano and Roell
(1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Maug (1998, 2002), Aghion, Bolton, and
Tirole (2004), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), and Brav and Mathews (2008).
4When blockholders are dened as 5% shareholders, Holderness (2009) nds that 96% of U.S. rms contain a
blockholder. However, when the minimum ownership is dened as 20%, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1999) document that 20% (10%) of large (medium) U.S. rms contain a blockholder. They estimate that a
20% stake gives e¤ective control if the shareholder is an insider; the threshold is likely to be higher for outside
shareholders. Hence, blockholders are prevalent in the U.S., but tend to lack control rights. Holderness nds
that concentrated blockholders with board seats tend to be families. This paper focuses on nancial blockholders
who typically hold smaller stakes and have less frequent board representation.
5See Becht et al. (2008) and Black (1990)) for details of such barriers. Armour et al. (2007) document that
U.S. shareholders seldom engage in litigation, and rarely succeed if they do; the same is true for the proxy ght
mechanism. As Lowenstein (1988) writes: [Institutional investors] implicitly praise or criticize management,
by buying or selling, but seldom get involved more directly, even to the extent of a phone call. There is almost
no dissent from the Wall Street Rule.
6Similarly, intervention models would imply little role for holders of non-voting shares, even if they have
large stakes. This paper shows that such investors can improve rm value by their trading behavior.
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research on the real-life importance of governance through trading. The survey evidence of
McCahery, Sauntner, and Starks (2008) nds that institutions use exitmore frequently than
any other governance mechanism, and Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) document direct evidence
of this channel.
The analysis of di¤erent governance mechanisms (exit versus voice) leads to di¤erent results
regarding the optimal block size for rm value and the e¤ect of liquidity on governance. In a
number of theories of voice, a larger block is always desirable as it increases monitoring and
intervention incentives. Here, block size has a non-monotonic e¤ect on rm value. Trading
prots depend not on block size per se, but on the amount sold upon bad news. If the block
becomes too large, market liquidity declines and the blockholder cannot sell her entire stake.
Since her potential trading prots are lower, she acquires less information, so prices are less
e¢ cient. This nite optimum is consistent with the paucity of large blockholders in the U.S.
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)). Large stakes may not only be unnecessary
for a blockholder to exert governance, but also undesirable.
The second di¤erence from prior research concerns the desirability of liquidity. Motivated
by several intervention theories, Bhide (1993) argues that, since blockholders add value through
voice, and voice and exit are mutually exclusive, liquidity is harmful as it allows a shareholder
to leave rather than intervene. In this paper, the blockholder adds value through loyalty
to a fundamentally sound rm that su¤ers weak short-term earnings. Loyalty and exit are
similarly mutually exclusive and so it may seem that liquidity is again undesirable, since it
allows shareholders to sell easily upon weak earnings, causing managers to focus excessively on
earnings. Indeed, Porter (1992) and Thurow (1993) argue that the U.S.s liquid markets deter
long-run investment, potentially endangering the U.S.s future international competitiveness.
They advocate policies to reduce liquidity and thus create unconditionally long-run shareholders
who never sell.
However, this paper shows that the mutual exclusivity of loyalty and exit paradoxically leads
to complementarities between them. If a blockholder has retained her stake despite low earnings,
this is a particularly positive indicator of fundamental value if she could easily have sold instead.
In short, the power of loyalty relies on the threat of exit. The result that blockholders promote
long-run behavior does not stem from simply assuming that blockholders are unconditionally
long-run investors who never sell. Indeed, an investors loyalty upon bad news is uninformative if
market illiquidity prevented her from exiting anyway. Instead, conditional loyalty and the threat
of short-term selling can, surprisingly, promote long-term investment. Far from exacerbating
myopia, the liquidity of the U.S. capital allocation system may be a strength. This implication
may explain why the above fears for the U.S.s global competitiveness have not been borne out.
Consistent with the model, Fang, Noe and Tice (2008) document a causal relationship between
liquidity and rm performance, which arises because liquidity leads to greater price e¢ ciency.
This result builds on Maug (1998), who overturned earlier papers arguing that liquidity is
undesirable in an intervention setting by pointing out that they assume an exogenous block
size. Maug shows that when block size is endogenous, liquidity is benecial since it encourages
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a larger block to form in the rst place. In the present paper, liquidity has a second benet it
leads to increased liquid trading by these blocks, once formed. While such trading is harmful
in an intervention framework (and so the benets of liquidity stem entirely from their e¤ect on
initial block size), in an exit model it is the very mechanism through which the blockholder adds
value. Hence, increasing liquidity from low levels is benecial even if block size is exogenous
and does not rise in response to greater liquidity.7 Here, liquidity is desirable not only for the
reason introduced by Maug, but also because it leads to more liquid trading. This conclusion is
potentially important because disclosure requirements or regulation may restrict block size from
rising in response to liquidity (see, for example, Roe (1994)) and prevent the rst benet from
being obtained. Indeed, in the U.S., ownership is fragmented despite high liquidity, suggesting
that these forces may be important. Even if this is the case, liquidity can be valuable.
While the papers main result is that blockholders can encourage investment, the corollary
is that a key cost of the U.S.s dispersed ownership is myopia. This leads to an additional policy
implication. Previous papers argue that the main problem with atomistic shareholders is that
they lack the control rights to intervene and thus allow the manager to shirk (e.g., Roe (1994)).
In this case, potential solutions to dispersed ownership are equity compensation and regulations
against takeover defenses. However, if the main cost is that dispersed shareholders focus on
current earnings and thus induce myopia, these policies exacerbate the issue. The problem with
small shareholders may not be so much the separation of ownership from control(Berle and
Means (1932)) as the separation of ownership from information.
The paper closes with empirical implications. One set concerns stock price e¤ects, and is
unique to a model in which blockholders trade rather than intervene. While block size does not
matter in standard microstructure theories, here it is positively correlated with an investors
private information, trading prots, and price e¢ ciency. Existing empirical studies typically
use institutional ownership as a measure of investor informativeness, but the model suggests
that block size may be more relevant, since sizable stakes are necessary to incentivize investors
to gather information. Bushee and Goodman (2007) and Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) indeed
nd larger shareholders are more informed. More generally, the model suggests a shift in focus
in the way we think about blockholders that can give rise to new directions for empirical
research. Previous studies have been primarily motivated by perceptions of blockholders as
controlling entities (e.g., Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1991)), but new research questions
may be motivated by conceptualizing them as informed traders. (See Brockman and Yan
(2009) and Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan (2008) for two recent such papers.) A second set
relates to real e¤ects: blockholders should increase rm investment (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2009)), and deter earnings manipulation (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Farber (2005),
Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2008)). These predictions distinguish the model from theories where
the blockholder solves managerial shirking or the pursuit of pet projects, rather than myopia.
7When block size is exogenous, the optimal liquidity is nite because too much liquidity camouages the
blockholders trades and reduces price informativeness. With endogenous stakes, increasing liquidity is desirable
even at high levels since block size increases with liquidity to prevent such camouage.
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Admati and Peiderer (2009) also analyze a blockholder who can only engage in exit rather
than voice. Our papers focus on fundamentally di¤erent agency problems: while Admati and
Peiderer analyze e¤ort (broadly dened to incorporate both shirking and free cash ow prob-
lems), I study investment, in particular, whether it is deterred by liquid trading as commonly
believed. While the e¤ort conict may have been attenuated by recent increases in the man-
agers sensitivity to the stock price, such changes further exacerbate myopia. A second di¤erence
is that Admati and Peiderer assume that the blockholder is exogenously informed, and so the
level of monitoring is xed. This paper endogenizes costly information gathering and generates
testable predictions regarding the e¤ect of block size on monitoring and trading, and in turn
market e¢ ciency, real investment, and rm value. By contrast, Admati and Peiderer focus on
the nature of the agency problem and derive the interesting result that while the blockholder
always attenuates free cash ow problems, she sometimes exacerbates shirking.
The benecial e¤ect of ex post monitoring on ex ante investment is shared by Edmans
(2007). Debt concentrates equityholders stakes, incentivizing them to discover the cause of
interim losses. Thus, debt can allow liquidation of an incompetent manager who su¤ers short-
term losses, without simultaneously deterring skilled managers from long-term projects that risk
such losses. While Edmans (2007) is a theory of capital structure that assumes intervention,
this paper is a theory of ownership structure in which the blockholder can only trade.
In Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), increased market e¢ ciency allows prices to more accu-
rately reect managerial e¤ort, increasing the optimal sensitivity of pay to the stock price. In
their model, monitoring is performed by atomistic shareholders and they do not consider block-
holders as potential monitors hence, blocks reduce price e¢ ciency via their negative e¤ect on
liquidity. I show that blockholders may be particularly important monitors as they have the
strongest incentives to gather the intangible information that is especially relevant for long-term
investment. Without blockholders, the stock price primarily reects publicly available current
earnings. Thus, tying the managers pay to the rms stock price can induce myopia.
A nal strand of related literature concerns insider trading by management, which can
also increase nancial and real e¢ ciency (e.g., Manne (1966)). The blockholder is likely to be
signicantly more e¤ective than the manager at impounding information into prices for several
reasons. First, managers are constrained by insider trading laws, personal wealth (limiting
purchases), or lock-ups of stock as part of incentive packages (limiting sales). Second, the
manager may be conicted since the stock price is used to evaluate him, and so may choose not to
reveal negative private information by selling shares. Third, conicts may also arise because the
manager has control over the information ow and investment decisions (Bernhardt, Hollield,
and Hughson (1995)). He may release false negative (positive) information and subsequently
buy (sell) shares, or sell his shares and take the incorrect investment decision. One paper that
does analyze insider trading by the blockholder is Maug (2002), who shows that legalizing such
actions can induce her to exit rather than engage in value-enhancing intervention.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the basic model, which links block
size to nancial e¢ ciency. Section II presents the core result of the paper by introducing man-
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agerial decisions and illustrating the impact on real e¢ ciency. Section III discusses empirical
predictions and Section IV concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs not in the main paper.
I. Blockholders and Market E¢ ciency
This section analyzes the e¤ect of block size on monitoring and stock prices. The real
consequences are studied in Section II, where managerial decisions are introduced.
I consider a rm with one share outstanding. A blockholder (B) owns  units and atomistic
shareholders collectively own the remaining 1    units. All agents are risk-neutral and the
risk-free rate is normalized to zero. There are three periods, summarized in Figure 1. At
t = 1, a public signal s 2 fsg; sbg, such as an earnings announcement, is released. The signal
is imperfectly informative about the rms fundamental value V , which is revealed at t = 3. If
s = sg, V = X > 0 with certainty; if s = sb, V = 0 or X with equal probability. I refer to a
rm with V = X (0) as a high (low)-quality rm;s = sg is a good signaland s = sb is a
bad signal(also referred to in the text as lossesor low earnings).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
At t = 2, B exerts monitoring e¤ort  2 [0; 1] at cost 1
2
c2. Monitoring gives B a private
signal i 2 fig; ibg of V , the precision of which rises with  as follows:
Pr(igjX) = Pr(ibj0) = 1
2
+
1
2

Pr(igj0) = Pr(ibjX) = 1
2
  1
2
:
The posterior probabilities that the rm is of high quality are thus given by
Pr(Xjig) = 1 + 
2
Pr(Xjib) = 1  
2
= b: (1)
If  = 0, private information is completely uninformative and the posterior equals the prior
1
2
; if  = 1, B knows V with certainty. There is then a round of trading. The blockholder
either demands nothing (b = 0) or sells  units (b =  ); she sells if she receives signal ib and
holds otherwise.8 I assume    owing to short-sales constraints, since this papers focus is
8The core analysis involves the blockholder selling or holding, since this papers focus is the Wall Street Rule:
the shareholder exit that is widely believed to exacerbate myopia. The results are unchanged by allowing the
blockholder to buy a xed amount regardless of her initial stake. While the incentives to buy are una¤ected by
, the ability to sell remains (non-monotonically) increasing in . Hence, overall prots from information, and
thus monitoring incentives, remain non-monotonically increasing in . The results are in the Internet Appendix,
available at www.afajof.org.
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non-interventionist nancial blockholders such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies, the vast majority of which are unable to sell short. The models results continue to
hold under nontrivial short-sales costs, as discussed in Section I.A.
Also at t = 2, liquidity traders demand u, where u is exponentially distributed, that is,
f(u) =
(
0 if u  0
e u if u > 0;
where  = 1
(1 ) and   1 is a liquidity parameter. The competitive market maker sees total
demand d = b+ u and sets a price P equal to the conditional expectation of V given d and s,
similar to Kyle (1985).
The parameter  captures factors other than free oat (1   ) that a¤ect liquidity, such
as transaction costs, taxes, disclosure requirements, and other regulations. Since the mean
liquidity trade is E(u) = 1

, we have the standard feature that the volume of liquidity trades
is increasing in the amount held by small shareholders (1   ), since liquidity trades often
emanate from current investors. While liquidity trades are literally modeled as purchases,
all of the models results continue to hold if the distribution of liquidity trades is transposed
downwards, so that the bulk of such trades are sales. Since only current shareholders can sell
the stock, there is a clear connection between free oat and liquidity. This linkage remains
under the literal interpretation of liquidity trades as purchases. Current shareholders are likely
to be more informed about a particular stock than non-shareholders, and thus more likely to
be purchasers if there is ambiguity aversion, or if non-shareholders do not know about the
stocks existence see Merton (1987) for a model in which investors are restricted to buy stocks
that they know about. In Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), and
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), liquidity purchases also stem from existing owners.
The exponential distribution of u, also used in Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), is used for
tractability as it allows Bs sale volume to be derived in closed form. (The key idea that block
size a¤ects the ability to sell on negative information, and thus monitoring incentives, does not
depend on the functional form for u). Kyle (1985) achieves tractability with normal liquidity
trader demand as rm value is also normal. In most corporate nance models featuring the Kyle
model, rm value is binary and so the informed traders order cannot be solved for; such papers
therefore typically restrict her trade to exogenous amounts. The exponential distribution in
this paper allows her trade to be endogenously derived as a function of block size.
A. Market Equilibrium
If signal sg is emitted, the market maker knows that the rm is of high quality, and so
sets P = X. Since the signal is fully revealing, B has no incentives to monitor or trade. The
remainder of this section focuses on the interesting case of s = sb, and so j sbnotation is
omitted for brevity. Since the signal is not fully revealing, B does monitor and trade, and the
market maker tries to infer Bs information from total order ow d.
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Lemma 1 below presents the Nash equilibrium, where Bs trading and monitoring decisions
are optimal given the market makers pricing function, and the market makers pricing function
earns him zero prot given Bs decisions. I assume X  8c to ensure that e¤ort does not exceed
the maximum of one.
Lemma 1: Upon observing sb and total demand d, the market maker sets the following prices:(
P = bX if d  0
P = mX if d > 0;
(2)
where
m = Pr(Xjd > 0) =
1 + e  + 
 
1  e 
2 (1 + e )
: (3)
The blockholder exerts monitoring e¤ort
 =
X
4c
: (4)
If and only if she observes signal ib , B sells
 = min

1

; 

: (5)
A full proof is in the Appendix; here I summarize the key intuition. If d  0, the market
maker knows that B has sold and thus has received ib. He therefore sets prices according to
the posterior b = Pr(Xjib) in equation (1). On the other hand, d > 0 is consistent with both
selling and not selling. In this case the market maker sets prices according to the posterior
m = Pr(Xjd > 0) in equation (3). This gives rise to equation (2).
If B receives signal ib, she wishes to sell. As in Kyle (1985), in the absence of short-sale
constraints, her optimal trade is nite ( 1

) as she is concerned with excessive price impact.
With short-sale constraints, B is unable to sell more than , her initial holding. If   1

, then
 = : liquidity is su¢ ciently high that B nds it optimal to sell her entire stake.
Lemma 2: The maximum sale volume  is given by
 =  =

 + 1
: (6)
Blockholder e¤ort  is also maximized when  = . Both  and  are increasing in  if
 < ; and decreasing in  if  > :
For  < , a larger initial stake raises the amount thatB can sell upon negative information,
and thus the incentives to become informed in the rst place. Simply put, the benets of
information are higher as B can make greater use of it. Empirical studies frequently assume
that incentives to monitor and trade are increasing in block size.9 While intuitive, such a result
9For example, Boehmer and Kelley (2009) assume that institutions could engage in information production
9
is not delivered by standard models of informed trading with no constraints (e.g., Kyle (1985)
and its variants). In these models, monitoring is independent of initial holdings: if an investor
uncovers negative information about a stock she does not own, she can short sell. Similarly, in
typical applications of the Kyle model to corporate nance (e.g., Maug (1998), Bolton and von
Thadden (1998), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004)), liquidity trades are discrete. Therefore,
the informed party has to match liquidity tradersvolumes to avoid being revealed, and so her
orders are again independent of her initial stake. This paper generates a link between  and 
via the combination of continuous liquidity trader demand and short-sales constraints. It thus
provides a theoretical framework underpinning the above empirical assumption.10
However, a second consequence of a higher stake is that it reduces liquidity. If  > ,
liquidity is su¢ ciently low that B chooses to sell only 1

if she receives signal ib. Further
increases in  reduce liquidity and thus the optimal trading volume 1

; since B expects to trade
less on information, she has fewer incentives to gather information. The optimal block size to
maximize information acquisition is therefore nite at .
If B can short-sell at a cost (as is the case for hedge funds), it remains the case that
increasing  from zero augments  and , as long as the cost is su¢ ciently nontrivial that
the reduction in short-sale costs that results from raising  outweighs the negative e¤ect on
liquidity; the results are in the Internet Appendix. A higher initial stake increases the prots
from selling on private information, since B can costlessly unwind a long position rather than
engage in costly short-sales. Hence, B has greater incentives to acquire private information. As
in the core model, once  is su¢ ciently large, further increases in  lower  and  because the
negative e¤ect on liquidity dominates, so the relationship is again concave.
Equity analysts are also potential monitors and can move prices without trading. The
activity of equity analysts (and other hedge funds) is captured in the parameter c. This is
Bs cost of acquiring private information not already in the market and is therefore inversely
related to the rms information asymmetry. If analyst and hedge fund activity is high, most
value-relevant information is already in the market price and the cost of acquiring incremental
information is large. Section II demonstrates that this reduces the blockholders value added.
It is straightforward to show that B does not sell (hold) upon receiving ig (ib). Selling in
the absence of negative private information would drive the price down and reduce her portfolio
value at t = 2 as well as t = 3. Hence, even a blockholder concerned with interim performance
(e.g., a fund manager evaluated by investors) will not sell purely on public information.
once their holdings exceed a certain threshold. Rubin (2007) posits that the probability that a particular
institution will incur the costs to do so is higher if it enjoys a comparatively large ownership share.
10In Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008), monitoring does increase in the investors holding, but because
she is risk-averse and wishes to reduce uncertainty, rather than because a larger block expands the set of feasible
trading strategies.
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B. Market E¢ ciency
This section analyzes the relationship between block size and price e¢ ciency. A high-quality
rm has a
 
1
2
+ 1
2


chance of emitting signal ig, in which case B does not sell and the price
is mX. It has a
 
1
2
  1
2


chance of emitting signal ib, in which case B sells. If u   (which
occurs with probability 1   e ), then d  0 and the price is bX. Otherwise the price is
mX. Hence, the expected price of a high-quality rm is
E[P j X] = XX ;
where the expectation is taken over the possible realizations of i and u, and
X =

1
2
+
1
2
+

1
2
  1
2


e 

m +

1
2
  1
2

 
1  e  b
=
1
2

2
1  e 
1 + e 
+ 1

. (7)
I use X as a measure of market e¢ ciency as it captures the closeness of expected prices to
fundamental value.11 If X = 1, price equals fundamental value and the market is fully e¢ cient.
As X declines, the expected price of the high-quality rm falls from its fundamental value of
X.
Proposition 1 (Market E¢ ciency): Market e¢ ciency X is maximized at  = . It is
increasing in  for  < , and decreasing in  for  > .
Proof : If  < , then  = . Di¤erentiating equation (7) with respect to  gives
@X
@
=
2e 
(1 + e )2| {z }
trading e¤ ect
+
2 
1 e
 
(1 + e )2| {z }
camouage e¤ ect
+ 
1  e 
1 + e 
@
@| {z }
e¤ort e¤ ect
: (8)
The trading e¤ectis the direct impact of . It is positive if and only if  < , since an
increase in  raises the amount sold by B upon negative information. Simply put, if B trades
more, her trading (or non-trading) impounds more information into prices.
The camouage e¤ectoperates indirectly through  decreasing liquidity. Since liquidity
camouages Bs trades, this e¤ect is positive for all levels of , as a fall in liquidity increases
her e¤ect on prices.
The e¤ort e¤ectoperates indirectly through  a¤ecting . This e¤ect is positive if and
only if @
@
> 0, that is,  < . Increased e¤ort leads to B receiving a more informative signal.
Her trades thus convey greater information about V . Overall, if  < , all three e¤ects are
positive, and so an increase in  raises market e¢ ciency.
11Note that the price is always e¢ cient in the sense of equaling fundamental value conditional upon an
information set. However, when  rises, this information set is richer and so prices are closer to (unconditional)
fundamental value.
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If  > , then  = 1

. Di¤erentiating with respect to  gives
@X
@
= 
1  e 1
1 + e 1
@
@| {z }
e¤ort e¤ ect
: (9)
From Lemma 2, the trading e¤ect is negative, as liquidity is su¢ ciently low that B only
sells 1

, which is decreasing in . The negative trading e¤ect exactly cancels out the positive
camouage e¤ect. This leaves the e¤ort e¤ect, which is negative from Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Even considering only the benets of blockholders and ignoring their costs, the optimal block
size for market e¢ ciency is a nite level, . (Section II shows that the  that maximizes market
e¢ ciency also optimizes rm value). This result contrasts with some intervention models such
as Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998) where rm value is
monotonically increasing in block size.12 In this model, it is not block size per se that matters,
but the associated optimal trading volume: prices are a function not of , but of min
 
1

; 

.
A large block increases information revelation only to the extent that there is su¢ cient market
liquidity to allow it to be sold entirely. Put di¤erently, the fact that B has not exited is less of
a positive boost to the stock price if exit was di¢ cult in the rst place. This nite optimum
is consistent with the nding that, while blockholders are common in the U.S. (Holderness
(2009)), substantial blockholders are rare (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)).
In reality, other market participants may be able to observe blockholderssales with a lag,
by studying Section 13 lings. This would strengthen Bs impact on market e¢ ciency. Since
sales are only observed with a lag, Bs prots from informed selling are unchanged. However,
her price impact is greater: after the ling is made, the price moves even closer to fundamental
value since the market can now observe the trade directly.
II. Blockholders and Long-Term Investment
The previous section links blockholders to increased nancial market e¢ ciency. This section
demonstrates that the latter can in turn augment real e¢ ciency, by addressing the potentially
important myopia issue. I thus illustrate a social benet for information gathering that is
motivated purely by the private desire to prot from informed trading.
The model is extended to allow for managerial decisions. The risk-neutral13 manager (M)
places weight ! on the t = 2 stock price and 1   ! on the t = 3 rm value, where 0 < ! < 1.
12Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998) also derive a non-monotonic e¤ect of
block size. In their models, market e¢ ciency is maximized with a zero block. They derive nite optimal block
sizes as they trade o¤ market e¢ ciency against, respectively, monitoring costs and intervention. In this paper,
the optimal block size is nite even focusing on market e¢ ciency alone. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)
derive a nite optimal block size as too large a block can erode managerial initiative. In Pagano and Roell
(1998), too large a block can lead to overmonitoring.
13Introducing managerial risk aversion would strengthen the results, since the blockholder reduces the variance
in the price of a high-quality rm that emits sb, as well as increasing its mean.
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Since this paper focuses on the solution to myopia rather than its cause, the concern with
the current stock price (! > 0) is taken as exogenous. This is a standard assumption in the
literature and can be motivated by a number of underlying factors, such as takeover threat
(Stein (1988)), concern for managerial reputation (Narayanan (1985), Scharfstein and Stein
(1990)), or the manager expecting to sell his own shares at t = 2 (Stein (1989)).14
At t = 0, the manager of a high-quality rm can invest in a long-term project that un-
ambiguously increases fundamental value, but risks low interim earnings. The most natural
example is intangible investment that is expensed and thus di¢ cult to distinguish from losses
made by a low-quality rm. Let  2 [0; 1] denote the amount of investment. Investment of 
boosts the rms t = 3 value to V = X + g, but risks emitting sb at t = 1 with probability
2 (otherwise, sg is emitted). The parameter g measures the productivity of the investment
project. The choice of  does not involve a personal utility cost to M : there is no standard
e¤ort conict. The availability of this investment project is not known to the market maker nor
to B, to emphasize the fact that B can induce M to exploit growth opportunities even if she
is unaware of their existence (in contrast with intervention models). In reality, new investment
opportunities frequently become available to managers that were previously unforeseen. The
Internet Appendix shows that the results continue to hold if  is anticipated.
At t = 0, the manager of a high-quality rm chooses  to maximize
(1  !) (X + g) + !2XX + !(1  2)X: (10)
The rst term is rm value, multiplied by its weight in the objective function. The stock
price is X if sg is emitted, which occurs with probability (1  2), else XX. This gives rise to
the second and third terms.
Lemma 3: The manager chooses investment level  given by
 = min

(1  !) g
2!X (1  X) ; 1

. (11)
If  < 1, it is increasing in g and X , and decreasing in X and !.
The amount of long-term investment is naturally increasing in its productivity g, and de-
creasing with the cost of emitting sb. The latter is positively related to the di¤erence in value
between high- and low-quality rms X, and Ms concern for the current stock price !. Note
that myopia is rational: the stock price falls upon sb since it may have been emitted by a
low-quality rm; given the risk of this decline, M optimally sets  below its rst-best level of
one.
Investment increases with X , since greater market e¢ ciency means that prices more closely
reect fundamental value. Since X in turn depends on , investment depends on block size.
14Even if the managers sole objective is to maximize long-run shareholder value, he will care about the stock
price as it a¤ects the terms at which the rm can raise equity at t = 2 (Stein (1996)).
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Indeed, taking rst-order conditions of equation (11) with respect to  and calculating cross-
partials with respect to g, c, and ! leads to Proposition 2 below, the main result of the paper.
Proposition 2 (Investment): Dene X1 =
(1 !)g
!
and X2 =
(1 !)g
!
1+e 1
2e 1 . For all X, invest-
ment  is weakly increasing in X . It is therefore maximized at  = , weakly increasing in 
for  < , and weakly decreasing in  if  > . If X  X2, these directional e¤ects are strict
and  is uniquely maximized at  = . If X  X1, M invests e¢ ciently ( = 1) regardless of
X and thus .
The magnitude of the block-sensitivity of investment j @
@
j is weakly increasing in g and weakly
decreasing in c and !, that is, @
2
@@g
 0, @2
@@c
 0, and @2
@@!
 0 for  <  and @2
@@g
 0,
@2
@@c
 0, and @2
@@!
 0 for  > .
The central result of this paper is that blockholders can add value, even in the absence of
an underlying e¤ort conict and the ability to intervene. By engaging in informed trading to
maximize their own speculative prot, they can promote long-term investment. For  < ,
increasing block size raises market e¢ ciency X (Proposition 1) and thus makes the price
more closely reect fundamental value. From equation (11), a higher X in turn augments
real e¢ ciency: the manager is more willing to undertake positive-NPV long-term investment
projects that risk interim turbulence because the stock price fall upon short-term losses is
attenuated.
While Proposition 2 shows that sizable shareholders promote investment, the corollary is
that a key cost of dispersed ownership is that it magnies myopia. This cost contrasts with the
shirking traditionally focused upon (e.g., Roe (1994)) and has di¤erent policy implications. If
e¤ort is the main problem, equity compensation and a more active takeover market are potential
solutions. However, if myopia is the principal issue, such measures make it worse.
The benecial e¤ect of a blockholder on investment, @
@
, is decreasing in c and thus increasing
in information asymmetry. Where information asymmetry is high, there is more information for
B to impound into prices and so she has a greater incremental e¤ect. The blockholders impact
is also increasing in the protability of investment g up to a point ( @
2
@@g
> 0): if the investment is
unattractive, it will be little exploited even if B makes prices relatively e¢ cient. However, if g is
su¢ ciently high that X  X1,  = 1 8  and @@ = 0: the investment opportunity is su¢ ciently
attractive that M pursues it fully even in the absence of a blockholder. In a similar vein, the
impact of higher block size is greatest for moderate levels of !. If M is greatly concerned with
interim performance, he will still underinvest even in the presence of a blockholder ( @
2
@@!
< 0).
On the other hand, if the stock price is a minor concern (X  X1), M invests e¢ ciently in the
rst place.
A. Does Liquidity Deter Investment?
The previous section studies the optimal  for rm value, holding liquidity constant. This
section now examines the e¤ect of liquidity  on investment. I rst assume that  is exogenous
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and show that increasing  boosts investment at low levels, but reduces it at high levels. Next,
I allow  to be endogenously chosen by the blockholder in response to liquidity, in order to
maximize her total payo¤. In this case, increasing  always boosts investment.
A.1. Exogenous Block Size
Proposition 3 (Liquidity, Exogenous Block Size): Holding  constant, market e¢ ciency and
investment are maximized at  = 
1  . They are increasing (decreasing) in  for  < (>) 
.
From Proposition 2, investment is increasing in market e¢ ciency. Market e¢ ciency in
turn depends on two factors: how much information B gathers, and the extent to which this
information is incorporated into prices. While liquidity increases information gathering by
augmenting trading prots, it also camouages Bs trades and reduces their price impact. For
low (high) levels of e¢ ciency, the rst (second) e¤ect dominates. If there is zero liquidity, B
does not trade or monitor; if liquidity is innite, she does not a¤ect prices. The non-monotonic
e¤ect of liquidity contrasts with previous papers such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and
Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), where augmenting liquidity always increases stock price
informativeness. There is no camouage e¤ect in those papers as the informed investors trades
are unbounded; here, Bs maximum sale is capped at  due to short-sales constraints.15
As summarized by Bhide (1993), liquidity is undesirable in most previous papers, where
block size is exogenous and the blockholder chooses between intervention and intentional exit.16
In such papers, the blockholder adds value through voice; since voice and exit are mutually
exclusive, liquidity hinders the former by facilitating the latter. Here, the blockholder adds
value through retaining her stake through interim turbulence, increasing investment ex ante.
Since loyalty and exit are similarly mutually exclusive, it might seem that liquidity is again
undesirable as it encourages exit and thus deters loyalty. This is indeed the conventional
wisdom: liquidity allows shareholders to sell upon weak earnings, and thus makes managers
even more concerned with earnings. A number of commentators (e.g., Porter (1992), Thurow
(1993)) argue that the U.S.s liquid capital markets hinder long-term investment, and hence
have called for policy intervention to reduce liquidity.
This paper shows that, even holding  exogenous, increasing liquidity from low levels can
promote investment, and thus has very di¤erent policy implications. Although loyalty and exit
are indeed mutually exclusive, this leads to complementarities between them. The power of
loyalty relies on the threat of exit. By making exit more feasible, increased liquidity renders
15Some previous blockholder models (where  is not chosen by B) also conclude liquidity is not unambiguously
desirable. In Kahn and Winton (1998), liquidity has no e¤ect, rather than a non-monotonic e¤ect. Bolton and
von Thadden (1998) do feature an optimal level of liquidity. This arises because greater liquidity means a
lower stake: in their paper, liquidity is (1  ), so higher liquidity can only be achieved by a lower , which
reduces intervention and thus rm value. In this paper, liquidity is  (1  ), where  captures factors that
a¤ect liquidity unrelated to free oat. The model shows that there is an optimal , even if  is constant.
16Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) demonstrate that liquidity encourages intervention as it allows the stock
price to reect these value gains and thus the blockholder to earn a return if she has to exit unexpectedly, due
to a liquidity shock. In their model, exit is not intentional.
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loyalty more meaningful. In this model, the blockholder does not promote investment simply
by being a long-term investor who never sells; by contrast it is the possibility of selling in
the short-run that encourages the manager to make long-term decisions. Indeed, if market
illiquidity compelled the blockholder always to hold for the long run, she has no e¤ect on stock
prices and investment. The fact that she has not sold upon bad news is uninformative if she
was unable to sell in the rst place.
This result marks an important distinction from intervention models. If the blockholder
has no control rights, allowing her to sell in the short term is benecial for rm value as it can
promote investment. By contrast, if the blockholder is interventionist, the possibility of short-
term selling may induce her to step in and force the manager to undertake myopic decisions.
Therefore, not only is it unnecessary for blockholders to have control rights in order to exert
governance, but it may also be undesirable: to the extent that blockholders have short-term
considerations, they may add more value to the rm if they lack control rights.
A short-term blockholder without control rights might try to induce myopia by threatening
to punish the manager by selling her stake if earnings are low (because of investment). However,
such a threat is not credible as it is dynamically inconsistent: once the rm announces low
earnings, they are immediately incorporated into the stock price, and so the blockholder cannot
prot by selling. Opponents of liquidity argue that it allows shareholders to sell upon interim
losses, but this view lacks a theoretical framework to explain why investors would sell upon
weak earnings. In an e¢ cient market, the stock price reacts immediately to public information
such as low earnings, removing the incentive to exit. Investors can only prot by trading
on private information, and so trading is desirable as it impounds such information into the
stock price particularly if the trader has a sizable stake and so is likely to have engaged in
fundamental analysis. Indeed, Yan and Zhang (2009) show empirically that investors who trade
frequently are better informed than those who rarely trade. Moreover, the stocks that they own
do not exhibit long-run reversals, which is inconsistent with the view that they encourage short-
termism. The frequent trading observed in the U.S. may thus be a positive sign, as it suggests
that information is being impounded into prices.
A.2. Endogenous Block Size
Thus far, the analysis has focused on the normative issue of the block size that maximizes
rm value, . I now turn to the positive question of which block size is most likely to be
observed empirically. While the rm may be able to inuence  temporarily (e.g., by privately
placing equity with a blockholder), B can trade away from this initial stake. The only initial
block size that is robust to re-trade is the private optimum, P , that maximizes Bs trading
prots net of monitoring costs. This would also be the block size that B would choose if she
bought shares at t = 0 and her purchase was unobserved.17 (After the purchase,  becomes
17In Kyle and Vila (1991), the blockholder camouages her purchase by trading with liquidity investors. In
their model, this leads to an additional benet of liquidity it facilitates initial block acquisition.
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publicly known through Section 13 lings.)
I now characterize this private optimum. If B owns , her expected gross trading prots
are given by
() = Pr (sb)
1
2
e X (m   b) :
The rst term is the probability that sb is emitted18 and the second is the probability that B
receives signal ib, in which case she sells . With probability e , u >  and so Bs information
is not revealed to the market; she earns X (m   b) per unit. Her expected monitoring costs
are given by
	() = Pr (sb)
2X2
32c
;
and so her objective function is
() 	() = Pr (sb)X
2
8c
2

e 
1 + e 
  1
4

: (12)
Proposition 4 below states that both P and  are monotonically increasing in .
Proposition 4 (Liquidity, Endogenous Block Size): The privately optimal block size P is
strictly less than the rm value optimum , and monotonically increasing in liquidity . Al-
lowing for the endogeneity of block size, investment  is monotonically increasing in .
Two forces reduce P below 
. First, a larger block size augments monitoring costs,
which the blockholder bears but are absent from the rms objective function. Second, a larger
block reduces liquidity and thus trading prots, which are also absent from the rms objective
function. By contrast, a decrease in liquidity has a direct positive e¤ect on rm value through
the camouage e¤ect.
When  is exogenous, investment is concave in liquidity: too high liquidity camouages
Bs trade, which is capped at . When  is endogenous, the camouage e¤ect is attenuated
since  rises with liquidity higher  allows B to trade more, and thus she chooses a higher
block. Hence, investment is now monotonically increasing in liquidity. This result echoes Maug
(1998), who also shows that liquidity is always desirable when  is endogenous. However, our
results for exogenous  are di¤erent. In Maug (1998), if  is exogenously high19, augmenting
liquidity reduces rm value (even if liquidity is currently low), and so the benets of liquidity
operate entirely through its e¤ect on initial block formation. In this paper, increasing liquidity
from low levels (if  < 
1 ) unambiguously increases rm value, even if  is exogenous.
In sum, there are two e¤ects of greater liquidity. First, as Maug (1998) shows, it leads to
18If q is the proportion of high-quality rms in the economy and r is the probability that a high-quality rm
emits sb, then Pr (sb) = 1  q + qr. Since Pr (Xjsb) = qr1 q+qr = 12 ; r = 1 qq and so Pr (sb) = 2  2q.
19In Maug (1998), liquidity is undesirable if a is exogenous and exceeds cM= (H   L), where cM is the cost of
intervention, and H   L is the gain in rm value from intervening. This condition is independent of liquidity,
and so if a is su¢ ciently high, raising liquidity can be harmful even if it is initially low. In this paper, raising
liquidity from low levels is always benecial.
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larger blocks. Second, it induces increased liquid trading by these blocks. In Maugs model,
when  is exogenously high and so liquidity only leads to liquid trading, increasing  is unde-
sirable because it deters blockholder intervention. By contrast, as discussed in Section II.A.1,
in this paper liquid trading alone can be benecial. Hence, liquidity has benets other than
its positive e¤ect on initial block size rst shown by Maug. The key to this result is that liq-
uid trading is the very mechanism through which the blockholder adds value, and so it is not
achieved in intervention models.
The result that liquidity can be desirable even when  is exogenous is potentially important,
because legal or institutional factors may deter B from endogenously changing  in response to
greater liquidity, and thus the rst benet from being obtained (see, for example, Roe (1994)).
For example, certain shareholders choose to hold fewer than 5% of a rms shares to avoid
triggering a Section 13(d) ling, or hold fewer than 10% to avoid being classied as an insider.
In the U.S., ownership is fragmented despite high liquidity, suggesting that these forces may be
important. This paper shows that liquidity can be desirable even if it does not lead to Maugs
advantage of more concentrated ownership.
B. Further Applications
In the general model,  is any action that boosts fundamental value but risks emitting sb.
Thus far,  has been interpreted as intangible investment and sb as short-term losses, but there
are many additional applications. Signal sb is any observable characteristic that reduces out-
sidersassessment of rm value since it is also consistent with a low-quality rm. Therefore,
 can represent fully observable investment for which the motive or quality is unknown. The
fundamental problem with investment is that the associated expenditures are di¢ cult to in-
terpret, even if they are fully visible. While R&D can be reported separately on the income
statement and atomistic shareholders can costlessly observe it, they do not know whether a rise
in R&D results from managerial excess (bad news about agency costs), the need to compensate
for failed past R&D e¤orts (bad news about operating costs), or e¢ cient exploitation of new
growth opportunities (good news). Upon observing signicant investment for which the motive
is unclear, B will gather information and trade accordingly.
Low  can also represent the pursuit of myopic actions that temporarily boost outsiders
perceptions, such as accounting manipulation, fraud, or milkingcustomer reputation through
lowering product or service quality. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) document a signicant
correlation between corporate fraud and unrestricted stock compensation, and Peng and Roell
(2008) nd that vested options encourage executives to manipulate earnings. Since the man-
ager can sell unrestricted stock and exercise vested options immediately, such compensation
increases ! and thus reduces . Allowing the manager of a low-quality rm to undertake a
value-destructive action that gives a probability of yielding sg (so that sg is also imperfectly in-
formative) would reinforce the results of the core model. The presence of a blockholder reduces
the managers ability to deceive the market about his rms quality, even in the short run.
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III. Empirical Implications
This papers broad objective is to demonstrate that blockholders can add value even if they
are unable to intervene, which potentially explains the prevalence of small blockholders in the
U.S. While the model also generates a number of more specic empirical implications, it must
be stressed that there are signicant challenges in testing them. First, the key variable (block
size) is endogenous, as shown in Section II.A.2. Therefore, it is insu¢ cient simply to document
signicant correlations between block size and an outcome variable. To show that blockholders
have the e¤ects predicted in the model, it is necessary to identify sources of exogenous variation
in block size. Second, empirical tests will need to take into account the models specic setting,
for example, exclude inside blockholders and blockholders who rarely trade on information (such
as families or index funds), and focus on situations where short-sales costs are nontrivial.
The implications are divided into three broad themes: the e¤ect of blockholders on nancial
markets, on rm behavior, and on rm value. We commence with the rst category. In this
model, blockholders exert governance through being informed traders, which in turn leads to
four predictions they have superior information; their trades impound information into mar-
ket prices; they earn trading prots; and their presence increases market e¢ ciency. Moreover,
the magnitude of these e¤ects should be concave in block size. These predictions are unique
to a framework where blockholders add value through trading, rather than intervention, and
where information acquisition depends endogenously on block size. In standard models of in-
formed trading (e.g., Kyle (1985)), block size has no e¤ect on information acquisition incentives.
Blockholders thus generate no excess returns, and their sales are no more informative than any
other investors trades. Owing to the short-sales constraint introduced by this paper, private
information is increasing in block size (up to a point). Bushee and Goodman (2007) nd that
the private information content of an institutional investors trade is indeed increasing in her
stake, and Hein and Shaw (2000) and Rubin (2007) document that ownership concentration
depresses liquidity as other market participants fear informed trading losses. More generally,
the paper suggests that ownership concentration may be a more accurate measure of investor
informedness than total institutional ownership. The latter plausibly measures the potential to
obtain information (since institutions have the expertise to conduct fundamental analysis), but
concentrated stakes are necessary to incentivize them to undertake such analysis. If institutional
ownership is high but dispersed, shareholders may not bear the costs of monitoring.
The second prediction is that, owing to blockholderssuperior information, their sales should
convey negative news and depress the stock price (unless these sales are motivated by non-
informational reasons, considered later). Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) show
that the negative stock price reaction to secondary block distributions is due to information,
rather than a sudden increase in supply or a reduction in expected blockholder monitoring.
Mikkelson and Partch (1985) further nd that the negative price impact is increasing in the
size of the block sold but not the blockholdersinitial stake. This result supports the models
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prediction that it is the amount traded that matters, not  per se.20 Sias, Starks, and Titman
(2006) show that the positive correlation between institutional ownership changes and stock
returns is causal, rather than institutions predicting future returns, or following short-term
momentum strategies and responding to past returns. Moreover, they demonstrate that the
price changes result from information, rather than liquidity or supply e¤ects. All of these
papers therefore provide additional support for the rst prediction, that blockholders have
superior information.
Although blockholders move prices, the third prediction is that they still earn trading prots
as the stock price is only partially revealing. Indeed, Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) show that
blockholders sell in advance of forced CEO turnover (a sign of low fundamental value), and
that long-horizon returns are negative after such sales. Institutions with larger positions sell
to a greater degree, implying they are better informed. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) nd that
large shareholders sell in advance of value-destructive mergers. Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan
(2008) demonstrate that frequent trading by blockholders is protable. Again, these papers
also provide support for the rst prediction of superior information.
The fourth prediction stems is generated by Proposition 1, which predicts that price e¢ -
ciency is concave in block size. Unlike the second prediction, this implication concerns the mere
presence of blockholders rather than their actual trades. Brockman and Yan (2009) nd that
stocks with higher block ownership contain greater rm-specic information, as evidenced by
a higher probability of informed trading, higher idiosyncratic volatility, and low synchronicity
with the market. Also consistent with the model, these e¤ects do not exist for blockholders
who are employee share ownership plans (ESOPs), which likely do not trade on information.
Amihud and Li (2006) nd that the price reaction to dividends is decreasing in institutional
ownership (which is typically highly correlated with blockholdings); their interpretation is that
institutional investors have already gathered and traded upon the information that would be
conveyed by the dividend change. Event-drift is another measure of price e¢ ciency: Bartov,
Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) nd that post-earnings announcement drift is lower in the
presence of greater institutional ownership, which is consistent with the view that institutions
impound earnings information faster into prices. Such correlations need not imply causation; in-
e¢ cient prices could attract blockholders as the potential for trading prots is higher. Boehmer
and Kelley (2009) document a causal positive relationship between institutional ownership and
price e¢ ciency. Both institutional trading and the level of institutional holdings (in the ab-
sence of trading) are associated with e¢ ciency. This result is consistent with the model, since
blockholders can increase price e¢ ciency either by trading on bad news, or not trading on good
news.
The second category of predictions concerns the e¤ect of blockholders on rm behavior, and
are more challenging to test. Proposition 2 predicts that investment is concave in block size.
20Block size per se would matter if blockholderssuperior information arises because their control rights grant
them preferential access to information. In this paper, superior information arises from greater incentives to
gather it.
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The primary interpretation of  is intangible investment, which presents empirical di¢ culties.
Blockholders are particularly valuable in promoting unobservable investment, but such invest-
ment will also be invisible to the empiricist. A potential indirect measure is Tobins q, which
measures the capitalized value of growth opportunities. Moreover, as explained in Section II.B,
 can also represent observable investment. While the total quantity of R&D and capex can
be veriably communicated in nancial statements, its quality cannot be. Although CEOs can
disclose the amount of investment, they still perceive strong disincentives to invest (Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)), since atomistic shareholders cannot distinguish productive in-
vestment from wasteful expenditure. Even if the productivity of investment is observable, it may
not be incorporated by the market if it is intangible, as shown by Edmans (2009). Indeed, Lee
and ONeill (2003) and Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk (1991) nd a positive correlation between
ownership concentration and R&D. While R&D is an input measure, patents are an output
measure and thus more closely related to the quality of investment. Lee (2005) nds a positive
correlation between ownership concentration and patents in the U.S. Atanassov (2008) shows
that blockholders reduce the negative impact of antitakeover legislation on patent citations.21
However,  is endogenous and may itself be determined by R&D, or a third unobservable
variable may have a causal e¤ect on both variables. For example, a rm with high R&D
may also have signicant uncertainty, increasing the potential for informed trading prots and
attracting blockholders. Thus, the above cross-sectional correlations can only be interpreted as
tentative support for the model. Since the empirically chosen  is likely to be the one chosen by
the blockholder, appropriate instruments will be those that shift the private optimum but are
unrelated to R&D. Examples include a negative liquidity shock, a sudden increase in surplus
cash (from the sale of other holdings or investor inows), temporary stock underpricing, a change
in management at the blockholder, or a change in regulation. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009)
use a time-series approach, tracking the e¤ect of changes in block ownership within a rm.
They nd that the appearance of certain blockholders in a corporation subsequently leads to a
signicant increase in investment. One potential argument against their causal interpretation
is that blockholders face substantial barriers to intervention (as stated in the introduction),
rendering it di¢ cult for them to actively change investment policy. This paper shows that
causation is possible without intervention: the arrival of the blockholder allows the manager
to pursue investment projects that he previously avoided owing to fears of interim turbulence.
Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) use the density of wealthy individuals near a rms
headquarters as a geographic instrument to identify .
Section II.B notes that low  can also be interpreted as the pursuit of actions that reduce
value but improve investorsshort-term perceptions of the rm, such as accounting manipula-
tion. Blockholders will see through such actions and thus deter them. Burns, Kedia, and
Lipson (2008) nd that ownership concentration is correlated with fewer and less severe nancial
21Hansen and Hill (1991), Bushee (1998), and Wahal and McConnell (2000) show a positive association
between R&D and institutional ownership; the latter is typically highly correlated with blockholdings. Bushee
also nds that myopia is driven by momentum investors who trade on current earnings and have small holdings.
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restatements. By contrast, diversied institutions are positively associated with restatements,
likely because they trade on public earnings rather than study fundamental value. Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) and Farber (2005) nd that rms identied by the SEC as fraudu-
lently manipulating earnings have lower blockholdings. Again, such cross-sectional correlations
can only be interpreted as weak support of the model since earnings manipulation may deter
blockholders. A denitive test of this prediction requires an instrument for block size.
Finally, I turn to the predicted relationship between block size and rm value. If block size
is always at the rm value optimum, there should be no relationship (as noted by Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) in the context of managerial ownership and rm value). However, as discussed
earlier, the empirically observed block size will likely di¤er from the rm value optimum, thus
generating the cross-sectional prediction that rm value is concave in the stake held by an
outside blockholder. While other papers show that too large a block can be ine¢ cient, in most
of these papers the ine¢ ciencies arise from the loss of private benets (Pagano and Roell (1998))
or underdiversication, which do not a¤ect the stock price. Therefore, these papers would not
generate this prediction. However, Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) do share the prediction
that market value is concave in block size, since too large a block reduces managerial initiative.
The time-series analog of the above prediction is that unanticipated block increases (de-
creases) in block size should generate positive (negative) event study reactions when initial
block size is low, but the e¤ects are reversed when initial block size is high. Changes in block
size may represent exogenous changes to the private optimum (e.g., liquidity shocks), which
move it closer to or further from the rm value optimum. Moreover, the absolute magnitude
of these changes should be increasing in information asymmetry and concave in growth oppor-
tunities. Models where rm value is monotonically increasing in block size would predict that
increases in block size would always have a positive e¤ect.
Testing this prediction requires identifying changes in block size not motivated by informa-
tion. (As noted earlier, information-based trades should move prices in the same direction as
the order, regardless of initial block size.) Wruck (1989) therefore focuses on private sales of
equity: since the purchaser is buying a large stake, he will undertake extensive due diligence to
ensure he is not trading against unreleased information. She nds that increases in ownership
concentration lead to increases (decreases) in rm value for low (moderate) levels of initial
concentration, consistent with this paper (and also with Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)).
IV. Conclusion
The traditional view of corporate governance is that it is exerted through direct intervention
in a rms operations. Under such a view, concentrated shareholders are desirable as they
have both the incentives and control rights to intervene. However, the dominant shareholding
structure in the U.S. is one of small blockholders. Compounded with substantial legal and
institutional impediments to intervention, it might appear that U.S. rms are poorly governed
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and their blockholders play a limited role.
This paper o¤ers a di¤erent perspective. It shows that blockholders can signicantly en-
hance rm value even if they lack control rights. By gathering and trading on intangible
information, they cause prices to reect fundamental value rather than current earnings. This
can encourage managers to undertake long-term investment arguably the primary challenge
facing the modern rm.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, many commentators predicted that the U.S. economy would
be surpassed by Japan, particularly in R&D-intensive industries, arguing that the U.S.s liquid
capital markets are a deterrent to investment. This paper shows that short-term trading may in
fact support long-term investment, as it impounds its e¤ects into stock prices. Thus, the U.S.
capital allocation system may be signicantly more investment-friendly than widely believed,
potentially explaining why the above fears have not materialized.
While the core model focuses on the e¤ect of blockholders on myopia, the trading mechanism
in the paper can attenuate many other agency problems, such as shirking (see, for example,
Admati and Peiderer (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2009)). The model can thus reconcile
evidence on blockholderslow ability to intervene (Black (1990), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (1999), and Becht et al. (2009)) with studies that show that blockholders a¤ect
corporate decisions.22 The model can also be extended to demonstrate how any agent that
gathers information about fundamental value and impounds it into prices can improve man-
agersex ante decisions and thus real e¢ ciency. This implies a social benet of short-sellers
(such as hedge funds) and equity analysts, although these actors also reduce the incremental
role for blockholders.
More generally, this paper suggests a new way of thinking about the governance role of
blockholders, giving rise to a number of potential avenues for future research. Existing the-
ories have modeled blockholders as controlling entities who add value through intervention,
and accordingly most empirical studies have focused on private benets and control rights. By
contrast, the model indicates that blockholders can be perceived as informed traders who exert
governance through inuencing prices. Therefore, future corporate nance theories of block-
holders could import more complex e¤ects typically featured in asset pricing models of informed
trading. For example, Edmans and Manso (2008) show that splitting a stake between multi-
ple informed traders increases trading volumes, market e¢ ciency, and consequently rm value.
They therefore derive multiple blockholders as an optimal shareholding structure, consistent
with empirical evidence. Similarly, new empirical directions may arise from perceiving block-
holders as informed traders rather than controlling entities. They should therefore generate
trading prots and augment price e¢ ciency, and their value added should depend on liquidity.
22See, for example, Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) on the benecial e¤ect of institutions on M&A decisions,
and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) on their inuence of corporate policies in general. Chen et al. show this
benet is increasing in block size and the absence of business ties (which is related to the threat of exit).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let b denote the market makers conjecture about the amount sold by
B upon receiving ib, and b denote the conjectured monitoring e¤ort. If d  0, the market
maker knows that B has sold, and thus received ib. If d > 0, the posterior probability that ig
was received is
Pr(igjd > 0) = e
 d Pr(ig)
e d Pr(ig) + e (d+
b) Pr(ib) :
Using Pr(Xjd > 0) = Pr(Xjig) Pr(igjd > 0) + Pr(Xjib) Pr(ibjd > 0), we eventually obtain
Pr(Xjd > 0) =
1 + e b + b1  e b
2

1 + e b :
Hence, the market maker sets the following prices:8<: P =
1 b
2
X if d  0
P =
1+e b+b1 e b
2(1+e b) X if d > 0:
If B has received ib, the rm is worth P =
1 
2
X to her. Since the market makers conjecture
is correct in equilibrium, b =  and so B makes zero prot if d  0. She only makes a prot if
d > 0, that is, u > . Her objective function is therefore
max

X
/Z

241 + e b + b

1  e b
2

1 + e b   1  2
35e udu:
The optimum is given by
 =
(
 if   1

1

if  > 1

as in equation (5). Since the market makers belief is correct in equilibrium, b = . This gives
rise to equations (2) and (3).
Now consider Bs monitoring decision. Net of monitoring costs, Bs prots are given by
Pr(ib) [Pr(u > ) (P jd > 0) + Pr(u  ) (P jd  0)  E[V jib]]  1
2
c2
=
1
2
X
"
e 
1 + e  + b  1  e 
2 (1 + e )
+
 
1  e  1  b
2
  1  
2
#
  1
2
c2; (A.1)
where the rst 1
2
is the probability that ib is received and e  is the probability that u > .
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Di¤erentiating with respect to  and then setting b =  derives the optimal  as
 =
X
4c
:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The blockholders trade is
 = min ((1  ); ) :
This is maximized at (1   ) = , that is,  = 
+1
. Since  = 
+1
maximizes , it also
maximizes  = X
4c
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Taking rst-order conditions of equation (10) with respect to  yields
(1  !)g   2!X(1  X): (A.2)
The rst term represents the increase in V that results from increased investment, and the
second term captures the lower expected stock price that results from the increased probability
of emitting sb. Setting the rst-order condition to zero and imposing the constraint   1 leads
to equation (11). The comparative statics with respect to g, X , X, and ! follow immediately.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (11),  = 1 if (1 !)g
2!X(1 X)  1, that is,
X  (1  !) g
2! (1  X) :
In turn, the minimum value of X = 12

2 1 e
 
1+e  + 1

is 1
2
(when  = 0) and the maximum
value is 1
1+e 1 (when  = 1,  =
1
2
and X = 8c so  = 1). Hence, when X  X1,  = 1
regardless of the value of X and thus . Conversely, when X > X2,  < 1 8 . Di¤erentiating
(11) with respect to  yields
@
@
=
@
@X
@X
@
(A.3)
=
(1  !) g
2!X (1  X)2
@X
@
.
Hence, when X > X2,  is strictly increasing in X and @@ has the same sign as
@X
@
. From
Proposition 1,  is therefore strictly increasing (decreasing) in  if  < (>) . For X = X2,
 = 1 for at most one value of  ( = ), and so the directional relationships remain strict.
For X1 < X < X2,  may be 1 for a continuum of values of , and so the relationship between
 and X (and thus ) is no longer strict.
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If @
@
6= 0, the cross-partials @2
@@g
and @
2
@@!
are given by
@2
@@g
=
1  !
2!X (1  X)2
@X
@
;
@2
@@!
=   g
2!2X (1  X)2
@X
@
:
If  < , @X
@
> 0 and so @
2
@@g
> 0 and @
2
@@!
< 0. If  > , all inequalities are reversed. We
also have
@2
@@c
=
(1  !) g
2!X (1  X)2
@2X
@@c
+
(1  !) g
!X (1  X)3
@X
@c
@X
@
;
where
@X
@c
=  1  e
 
1 + e 

2
c

=
 2X + 1
c
< 0;
@2X
@@c
=  @X
@
2
c
:
If  < , @X
@
> 0. Thus, @
2X
@@c
< 0 and @X
@c
@X
@
< 0, so @
2
@@c
< 0. If  > , all inequalities are
reversed. If @
@
= 0, all cross-partials are zero. Hence, Proposition 2 states the cross-partials in
terms of inequalities. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: From equation (7), the measure of market e¢ ciency is
X =
1
2

2
1  e 
1 + e 
+ 1

: (A.4)
If   
+1
, then  =  and so  = X
4c
: Let J = e 

(1 ) . The derivative with respect to  is:
@X
@
=   
2J 

(1 + J)2
< 0;
which is the negative camouage e¤ect. Thus, market e¢ ciency is maximized at the lowest
possible . If   
+1
, then   
1  and so the lowest possible  is

1  .
If  > 
+1
, then  = 1

and so  = X
4c
, which is increasing in , that is, @
@
> 0. Di¤erenti-
ating (A.4) with respect to  gives

1  e 1
1 + e 1
@
@
> 0;
which reects the benecial e¤ects of liquidity on e¤ort. If  > 
+1
, then  < 
1  and so
the highest possible  is 
1  . In both cases,  =

1  maximizes market e¢ ciency X . From
equation (11), increasing X in turn augments . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Dropping constants, Bs objective function (12) becomes
2

e 
1 + e 
  1
4

: (A.5)
We rst prove that P  +1 . If  > +1 , then  =  (1  ) and  = 1. Hence, (A.5)
becomes
2 (1  )2

e 1
1 + e 1
  1
4

;
which is decreasing in . Thus, B will never choose  > 
+1
. If   
+1
, then  =  and the
rst-order condition of (A.5) is
F (; ) = K

2  
(1 + J) (1  )2

  1
2
= 0; (A.6)
where K = J
J+1
and J = e 

(1 ) as before. At  = 
+1
, J = e 1 and so (A.5) becomes
e 1
e 1 + 1

2   + 1
1 + e 1

  1
2
;
which is negative for all  2 [0; 1]. Thus, P is strictly less than +1 .
Returning to equation (A.6), an increase in  augments J and thus also K. In addition, the
term in square brackets rises, and so @F
@
> 0. An increase in  reduces J and thus also K. In
addition, the term in square brackets falls, and so @F
@
< 0. Since
@F
@
+
@F
@
@
@
= 0;
we have @

P
@
> 0.
From equation (11), investment  is monotonic in market e¢ ciency X . In turn,
X =
1
2
0@2P X2
16c2
1  e 
P
(1 
P
)
1 + e
  

P
(1 
P
)
+ 1
1A : (A.7)
In addition to its positive e¤ect on X through augmenting P ,  also has a direct negative
e¤ect, the camouage e¤ect. We must therefore prove that the rst e¤ect dominates. For
brevity, I write  instead of P in what follows. We drop constants in equation (A.7) and
dene
G(; ()) = 2
1  e  (1 )
1 + e 

(1 )
:
Di¤erentiating G with respect to  yields
dG
d
= 2

1  J
1 + J
@
@
+
J
(1 + J)2(1  )2
@
@
  J
(1 + J)2(1  )



:
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From equation (A.6) above, we calculate
@F
@
=
1
(1 + J)2
@J
@

2  
(1 + J) (1  )2

+K

(1 + J)2 (1  )2
@J
@
+K

2(1 + J) (1  )2
 @F
@
=   1
(1 + J)2
@J
@

2  
(1 + J) (1  )2

 K 
(1 + J)2 (1  )2
@J
@
+K
1
(1 + J)
1 + 
(1  )3
The ratio of the rst term of @F
@
to the rst term of  @F
@
is
 @J
@
=
@J
@
= (1  )

: (A.8)
The ratio of the second terms is also (A.8). The ratio of the third terms is 1 
1+


. Therefore,
@
@
=  @F
@
=
@F
@
>
1  
1 + 


:
Dropping the constant 2, we have
dG
d
>

(1 + J)(1 + )

(1  J)(1  )  
2J
(1 + J)(1  )

:
It is su¢ cient to prove that the term in square brackets is positive. By Taylor expansion,
J = e 

(1 ) < 1  
(1  ) +
2
22(1  )2 ;
and so
(1  J)(1  )  
2J
(1 + J)(1  ) >


(1  )  
2
22(1  )2

(1  )  
2J
(1 + J)(1  ) :
Dropping 
(1 ) , we obtain 
1  
2(1  )

(1  )  J
(1 + J)
: (A.9)
Since  < 
+1
 1
2
, we have 
2(1 ) <
1
2
. Therefore,

1  
2(1  )

(1  ) >

1  1
2

1
2
=
1
4
:
In addition, since  <
1
2
and J  1, we also have
J
(1 + J)
<
1
4
:
Hence, (A.9) and thus dG
d
are positive. Therefore, X and  are increasing in . Q.E.D.
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t=1
Public signal s Î
{sg, sb} released
t=2
Blockholder exerts
monitoring effort m,
receives signal i Î {ig, ib},
and sells b Î [0, a]
Liquidity traders demand
u ~ exp(l)
Market maker observes d
= b + u and sets P =
E[V | d, s]
t=3
V is publicly revealed
Figure 1. Timeline of the model.
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